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Case No. 20160163 - CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
Kaitlin Homer, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner State of Utah 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals the magistrate's refusal to bind over one count of 
possession of a controlled substance. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the magistrate erred in refusing to bind the defendant over on Count 
one of the original information, possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine). 
Standard of Review. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at a 
preliminary hearing, the appellate court, like the magistrate, must view the 
"evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, il 10, 20 
P.3d 300 (citation omitted). A magistrate's bindover decision is afforded only 
"limited deference." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, iI 26, 137 P.3d 787. Whether 
probable cause exists is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Norris, 2001 UT 104, if 14 n.2, 48 P.3d 872. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); 
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Homer was originally charged with one count of third degree felony 
possession or use of a controlled substance (Schedule I or II - methamphetamine), ~ 
see Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), one count of class B misdemeanor possession 
or use of a controlled substance (Schedule III or IV - Lorazepam), see id, and one 
count of class B misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37a-5. R1. The felony Count was reduced to a misdemeanor on stipulation by the 
State and Defense counsel at the preliminary hearing. R18:23. The reduction was 
because of a change in Utah law that reduced the penalty for possession of a 
schedule I or II controlled substance from a felony to a Class A misdemeanor. Id. 
2 
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate refused to find probable 
cause to support Count 1 and dismissed the charge. R16. The Court later entered a 
formal written order dismissing Count 1. R66. Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed on the 
State's written motion. R53-54. The State timely appealed to the court of appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On August 28, 2015 Homer was in front of her father's home in St. George, 
Utah when police responded to a report of a protective order violation. R18:52• St. 
George Police Officer Doug Iverson observed Homer near the open passenger door 
of a parked truck. R18:7,ll. Homer was rummaging through some things in the 
truck and attempting to hide something underneath or near the floorboard on the 
driver's side. R18:7. Homer looked up at Officer Iverson, made eye contact as if to 
see if Officer Iverson was watching her," and locked the door of the truck, 
remaining outside. Id. 
1 Consistent with the standard of review for a magistrate's bindover decision, 
the following facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and 
all "reasonable inferences" are drawn in favor of the prosecution. See State v. Clark, 
2001 UT 9, ,r 10, 120 P.3d 300. 
2 The record filed by the clerk shows that the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing is contained in pages 18-50 of the record. For simplicity, transcript pages are 
referenced as "R18" accompanied by the page number shown on the transcript. 
3 
Officer Iverson spoke with Homer and believed that Homer was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol by the way she was acting. R18:6. Homer was "rubbing 
her arms, chewing on her cheeks," speaking inarticulately, having to repeat herself 
at times, and appearing very nervous. Id. 
Officer Iverson later performed a search of the truck based on consent from 
Homer's father who is the registered owner of the truck and gave Officer Iverson a 
key to the truck. R18:14-15. Inside the truck on the floorboard was some syringes 
containing a clear liquid residue. R18:8. A backpack inside the vehicle contained a 
small one-inch by one-inch baggie of a light crystal substance that Officer Iverson 
recognized as methamphetamine. RlS:14-16. The backpack also contained personal 
documents for Homer. Id. Homer told Officer Iverson in a later interview that the 
backpack and the documents were hers. R18:8,11. Homer also described exactly 
where it was in the truck. Rl8:8,11. 
Officer Iverson identified the suspected methamphetamine from his training 
and experience as a police officer. R18:9-11. He recognized the syringes as a typical 
means of ingesting methamphetamine and the small Ziploc baggie as the usual way 
in which methamphetamine was packaged. Id. Officer Iverson had nearly three 
years of experience as a police officer. R18:10. During those years he had attended 
4 
several drug interdiction and identification classes, and had seen drugs very often in 
the field. Id. He had also seen drugs test positive multiple times. Id. 
Magistrate's Ruling 
The magistrate refused to bind Homer over based on the fact that the officer 
"had not field tested the suspected methamphetamine." R66. No other reason was 
given. Id and R18:23-25. However, the magistrate did bind over on the 
paraphernalia "pursuant to the officer's testimony that the syringes and baggies3 
found in the vehicle are typically used to package and ingest methamphetamine." 
R66. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate concluded that the preliminary hearing evidence failed to 
support a reasonable inference that the contraband found in the truck was 
methamphetamine because the officer had not field tested the baggie of white 
crystals. 
By requiring the prosecution to produce a field test, the magistrate effectively 
replaced the relatively low probable cause standard with his own hypothetical 
3 The Court's Order Dismissing Count 1 for Lack of Probable cause refers to 
"baggies" in the plural. However, there was only one baggie associated with the 
suspected methamphetamine. 
5 
investigative ideal. He also ignored the requirement that the magistrate resolve all 
conflicts (or in this case, hypothetical conflicts) in favor of the prosecution. 
At the preliminary hearing stage, the prosecution has never been required to 
produce a field test in order to sustain a bindover. The prosecution need only 
adduce sufficient evidence that supports a reasonable belief that the defendant 
committed the charged offense. In assessing whether the evidence supports such a 
belief, the magistrate and reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution. When faced with competing reasonable inferences, the magistrate 
must choose those inferences that reasonably support the prosecution's case. The 
task of resolving those conflicts is left to the ultimate trier of fact. 
Here, the preliminary hearing evidence supported a reasonable inference that 
the contraband found in Homer's backpack and in the h·uck was methamphetamine. 
Homer was acting furtively and appeared to be hiding something on the 
floorboard of the truck, near where Officer Iverson found the syringes containing a 
clear liquid minutes later. Homer appeared at the same time to be under the 
influence of a conh·olled substance - acting nervous, rubbing her arms, chewing on 
her cheeks, speaking inarticulately, and having to repeat herself. The officer 
identified through his h·aining and experience that the crystalline substance was 
6 
packaged as if it was methamphetamine, appeared to have same light crystal 
appearance as methamphetamine, and that the nearby syringes with clear liquid 
residue were a common means of injecting methamphetamine. Although the officer 
did not field test the suspected methamphetamine, this did not negate the 
reasonable inference that the substance was methamphetamine. Particularly when 
the magistrate chose to bind over the baggie and syringes as paraphernalia that are 
"typically used to package and ingest methamphetamine." 
In sum, to the extent that one can infer from the evidence that a field test 
could have shown that the crystal substance was a lawful substance, the far more 
reasonable inference from the evidence is that a field test would have indicated that 
the substance was methamphetamine. The magistrate was required to accept the 
latter inference. Furthermore, the magistrate should not have measured the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented to him against his mvn "investigative ideal." 
The Court therefore erred in not binding Homer over on the methamphetamine 
charge. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO BIND OVER 
COUNTl 
7 
The magistrate concluded that the preliminary hearing evidence was not 
susceptible to any reasonable inference that the crystal substance in the baggie or 
syringes was methampheta1nine. The magistrate based this conclusion on the State's 
failure to produce evidence of a field test. It is possible, but not stated, that the 
magistrate may have believed the crystal substance to be something licit. 
The magistrate mistakenly presupposes that the State is required at the 
preliminary hearing stage to produce a field test or to exclude all reasonable 
alten1ative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence. As a result, the 
magistrate's ruling improperly measured the State's evidence against a hypothetical 
investigative ideal. It also effectively contradicted well-established precedent 
requiring a magistrate to resolve all conflicting evidence and inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. 
Because the magistrate misapplied the preliminary hearing standards, it also 
mistakenly concluded that the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that 
the baggie and syringes contained methamphetamine. As explained more fully 
below, the preliminary hearing evidence supports such an inference. 
8 
A. The prosecution need not preclude all reasonable alternative 
explanations or inferences at the preliminary hearing stage. 
The threshold standard for obtaining a bindover is well-established: "To bind 
a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary 
hearing by 'present[ing] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has 
been committed and that the defendant has committed it."' Stnte ·u. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
110, 20 P.3d 300 (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, 
"to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must ... produce believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. at 1 15 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
But the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause 
for a bindover is "relatively low" -the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. 
Id. at ,1,110, 16. Sec nlso State P. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ii 18, 137 P.3d 787. Under both 
the bind over and arrest standards, the prosecution must only present"' sufficient 
evidence to support a renso11nblc belief that an offense has been committed and that 
the defendant committed it."' Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if 20 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, il 
16) (emphasis added). 
In assessing whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that a 
defendant committed each element of the charged offense, the magistrate "must 
9 
view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r 10 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And, ''\vhen faced with conflicting 
evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence." Id. Rather, the 
magistrate" must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id. 
Likewise, when the evidence gives rise to competing reasonable inferences, 
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the prosecution's case. See 
id. at il 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternative 
inferences---0ne suggesting innocence and the other guilt-viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to prosecution, evidence supported probable cause); see also 
State 1,. Hmmtmelz, 2001 UT 51, ,r 20, 26 P.3d 223 (" Although defendants' 
characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence there 
are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate 
the reasonable inferences presented by the State"); State z,. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 45-46 
(Utah App. 1995) (conflicts or "uncertainties" in preliminary hearing evidence 
should be "left for the fact-finder to resolve at trial"). 
The magistrate must choose the inferences that support the prosecution, even 
when the magistrate believes that the opposing inferences appear to be more likely. 
Cf Clnrk, 2001 UT 9, ,rir 20-21 (finding prosecution had shown probable cause 
10 
despite identifying two plausible alternate inferences); Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ,r 20 
(finding probable cause despite competing plausible inferences of innocence and 
guilt). So long as the inferences that support the prosecution's case are reasonable, 
the rnagistra te must bind over. 
The prosecution, therefore, is not required to exclude all reasonable 
alternative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence at the 
preliminary hearing stage. To the contrary, as explained, when the evidence is 
conflicting, the magish·ate does not resolve those conflicts but leaves that task to 
the fact-finder at trial. The bindover standard is intended to leave the principal 
fact finding of the issues to the jury. State z,. Ramire:, 289 P.3d 444, 447 (Utah 
2012). 
The magistrate materially departed from this standard when it imposed a 
standard of evidence that has never been recognized in Utah Courts and he 
imposed his own idea of what type of evidence he thought the police officer 
should have gathered. The magistrate refused to draw those reasonable 
inferences in support of the prosecution's theory that the crystalline substance or 
clear fluid was methamphetamine. By requiring the prosecution at the 
preliminary hearing stage to produce a field test, the magistrate erroneously held 
11 
the State to his own personal hypothetical investigative ideal. State -u. Ashcn~ft, 
349 P.3d 664, 670 (Utah 2015), reh'g denied (May 13, 2015). Thus, the magistrate 
effectively replaced the "relatively low" probable cause standard heretofore 
required at preliminary hearing with a specific standard preferred by the 
magistrate. And, in so doing, the magistrate effectively converted the 
magistrate's role as gatekeeper, see Clark, 2001 UT 9, il 12, into that of the ultimate 
trier of fact. 
In that regard, requiring the prosecution to exclude all reasonable 
explanations of a defendant's innocence also directly conflicts with Utah appellate 
court precedent, which not only prohibits a magistrate from resolving conflicting 
evidence against the prosecution, but requires a magisb·ate to bind over whenever 
any reasonable inference from the evidence supports a reasonable belief that the 
defendant committed the crime. 
B. The magistrate erred in not drawing all reasonable inferences and 
resolving all conflicting reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution. 
The magistrate's ruling directly conflicts with longstanding Utah 
precedent requiring the magistrate to draw all reasonable inferences in support 
of the prosecution's case. The magistrate failed to draw any reasonable inference 
12 
that Homer possessed metharnphetamine. Instead, the magistrate focused its 
ruling on what type of evidence 111iglzt have been presented. State z,. Ashcmft, 349 
P.3d 664,670 (Utah 2015), reh'g de11ied (May 13, 2015). It should have focused 
exclusively on what was presented. Id. 
An inference is a "conclusion reached by considering other facts and 
deducing a logical consequence from them." Black's Law Dictionary 793 (8th ed. 
2004). Stated otherwise, an inference is "a deduction as to the existence of a fact 
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from 
proof of other facts." State 1,. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ,r 16, 3 P.3d 725. See also State 
v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (inference is "logical and reasonable 
conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not presented by direct evidence as to 
the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other facts from 
which by a process of logic and reason, based upon common experience, the 
existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact"). Speculation, 
on the other hand, is "the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which 
there is no certain knowledge." Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 1 16. 
The preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to a reasonable belief that 
The substance in the baggie and syringes was methamphetamine. The 
uncontroverted evidence before the magistrate was that Homer was acting as if she 
13 
was under the influence of drugs. R18:6. The Defendant appeared to be hiding 
something under the floorboard of the truck, where officers located the syringes 
containing a suspicious dear fluid. R18:7-8. The Magistrate himself found that 
syringes like the ones found are typically used to inject methamphetamine. R64. 
Officer Iverson recognized the crystal substance as methamphetamine and the 
containing baggie as the usual means of packaging metharnphetamine. R18:9-10. 
Officer Iverson based his belief on his nearly three years of experience that included 
several interdiction and drug trainings and multiple prior experiences where he had 
seen drugs in the field that tested positive. R18:6, 10. 
Taken together, the foregoing evidence and its reasonable inferences support 
a reasonable belief that the crystal substance was methamphetarnine. 
As is recognized in Ashcraft, the fact that Officer Iverson did not perform a 
field test on the methamphetamine does not negate those reasonable inferences. 
It may be possible that a field test would have concluded that the crystals in the 
baggie near the syringes were licit. However, in light of the evidence presented, 
it is much more likely that the test would have confirmed the illicit identity of the 
methamphetarnine and strengthened the State's case. In any event, such 
speculation about what may have been produced from a field test has nothing to 
do with vvhether there vvas sufficient evidence produced at the preliminary 
14 
hearing. State v. Ashcnft, 349 P.3d 664, 670 (Utah 2015), reh'g denied (May 13, 
2015). The Magistrate was required to consider the evidence that was presented, 
and not to evaluate its sufficiency against its own investigative ideal. ld.4 
Furthermore, magistrates may not dismiss a criminal charge because they think 
there is a "possible" inference from the evidence supporting an acquittal. State v. 
fo11es, 365 P.3d 1212, 1220 (Utah 2016). 
The ultimate question is not whether an officer should perform a specific type 
of investigation. The question is whether the evidence and its reasonable inferences 
support a reasonable belief that the crystal substance was methamphetamine. 
As explained, the most reasonable inference from the evidence in this case is 
that the substance was methamphetamine, that Homer knew it was 
methamphetamine, and that Officer Iverson' s deductions about the appearance and 
proximHy of the paraphernalia and methamphetamine were right on. But even if 
the evidence gave rise to a reasonable conflicting inference that the crystal substance 
4 And in any event those speculative prospects have nothing to do with the question before us. A 
reviewing court is not to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against a hypothetical-CSI-
based-investigative ideal. Instead of imagining the evidence that might have been presented, we 
consider the evidence that was presented, and evaluate its sufficiency through a lens that gives 
the jury's verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences. We find the evidence sufficient, and not 
undermined by speculation about further investigation that might have taken place. State v. 
Ashcraft, 349 P.3d 664,670 (Utah 2015), reh'gdenied (May 13, 2015) 
15 
m the baggie and that fluid in the syringe is something other than 
methamphetamine, the magistrate was obligated to accept the inference supporting 
the prosecution's case and to bind Homer over. 
The magistrate thus erred in refusing to bind over. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the Magistrate's refusal to 
bind Homer over for trial. 
Respectfully submjtted November 7, 2016. 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Addenduni A 
Magistrate's Order Dism.issing Count 1 for Lack 
of Probable Cause 
Brock R. Belnap #6179 
Washington County Attorney 
Bryan J. Wheat #14576 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
33 North 100 West #200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
( 435) 634-5723 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER DISMISSING COUNT 2 FOR 
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
vs. 
KAITLIN HOMER, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No 151501569 
Judge John J. Walton 
Based upon the motion of Bryan J. Wheat, Deputy Washington County Attorney, and for 
good cause appearing, this matter came before the Court for preliminary hearing on November 
16, 2016. The Court finds from the preliminary hearing that: 
I. There was insufficient probable cause to bind over Count I due to the fact that the 
police officer had not field tested the suspected methamphetamine and thus could not 
testify to any field test results. 
2. There was sufficient probable cause to bind over count 2. 
3. There was sufficient probable cause to bind over count 3 pursuant to the officer's 
testimony that the syringes and baggies found in the vehicle arc typically used to 
package and inject methamphctamine. No testimony was given about any 
paraphernalia relating to the Lorazepam. 
February 25, 2016 02:32 PM 1 of 2 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, Count 1 is dismissed for lack of probable 
cause pursuant to Rule 7(i)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
-----------------END OF ORDER-----------------------
(The signature appears at the top of the first page.) 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) CIVIL NO. 151501569 
) and 151501574 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) JUDGE JOHN J. WALTON 
) 
KAITLIN HOMER, ) 
} 
Defendant. ) 
) 
TRANSCRIPTION OF ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS 
HELD NOVEMBER 16, 2015 
* * * 
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Registered Professional Reporter 
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JAY T. WINWARD 
Attorney at Law 
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WITNESS: DOUG IVERSON 
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WITNESSES 
Direct Examination by Mr. Wheat . 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Winward ... 
WITNESS: HARVEY GORDON HOMER 
Direct Examination by Mr. Winward . 
WITNESS: ZACK BAHLMANN 
Direct Examination by Mr. Wheat . 
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November 16, 2015 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right. Let's take evidence 
in Ms. Homer's cases. What case are we taking, sir? 
MR. WHEAT: Ms. Homer's cases. 
THE COURT: Perfect. Let's take the 69 
case first, unless someone prefers otherwise. 
witnesses, Mr. Wheat? 
Your 
MR. WHEAT: That will be Officer Iverson 
from the St. George Police Department. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer, if you'll 
come forward, raise your right arm, and take the 
oath, please. 
DOUG IVERSON 
called as a witness and sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Come on -- come on up here, 
please, Officer Iverson. 
Mr. Wheat. 
Go ahead when you're ready, 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WHEAT: 
Q Good morning, Officer Iverson. Could you 
please tell us your name? Spell your last name. 
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Tell us who you work for. 
A Doug Iverson. 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt you briefly, 
Counsel. For those of you in the audience, 
Mr. Wiskowski has let the Court know that he had a 
doctor's appointment this morning, so if you're here 
for one of his cases, he's indicated that he'll be 
here shortly, but not here yet, so -- I'm sorry. 
ahead. 
MR. WHEAT: No problem. Thanks, your 
Honor. 
THE WITNESS: It's Doug Iverson, 
I-V-E-R-S-0-N. I work for St. George Police 
Department. 
Q (BY MR. WHEAT) Okay. And did you come 
into contact with Kaitlin Homer on August 28th of 
2015? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the nature of that contact, 
Officer? 
Go 
A Our original contact was a protective order 
violation. 
Q Okay. And tell me about your 
investigation. 
A I was 
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Q How did that lead to a drug investigation, 
I should say? 
A Okay. I was -- I was assisting Officer 
Bahlmann on his incident, and I made contact with 
Kaitlin out in front of her house near her pickup 
her dad's pickup. While he was conducting his 
investigation, just based on her mannerisms, the way 
she was acting, it appeared to me that she was 
possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Q Okay. And tell me about what led you to 
that conclusion. 
A Just the way she was acting. She was 
rubbing her arms, chewing on her cheeks. Her speech 
was not articulate at times. She would have to 
repeat herself. Just appeared very nervous. I know 
that it's hard to describe what nervous is. Some 
people are different than others, but it just -- in 
my experience, it appeared she was -- she was 
nervous. 
Q Okay. In your experience -- how long have 
you been a police officer? 
A Nearly three years. 
Q Okay. And is -- are you trained to 
identify this type of behavior? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q Okay. And did you get a good look and were 
you able to observe this closely? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, tell us what you did next. 
A Officer Bahlmann conducted his 
investigation. He finished up, transported Kaitlin, 
and I maintained on scene to collect a witness 
statement for Officer Bahlmann. In talking with her 
father, Mr. Homer, I told him what my concerns were, 
asked if he would allow consent to search the 
vehicle, in which he filled out a consent form, 
signed, and I conducted an investigation from there. 
Q Okay. Now, tell us about this vehicle. 
How was it connected to the defendant? 
A Kaitlin was near the vehicle when we got 
there. The door was open. She was -- she was 
rummaging through some things in the vehicle, and, 
while there -- she was standing by the passenger door 
that was open. I observed her attempting to hide 
something underneath the floorboard or near the 
floorboard on the driver's side. Then she kind of 
looked up and locked it, maintaining eye contact with 
me to see if maybe I was watching her. 
Q Okay. And now tell us about the search. 
Tell us about how that went. 
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A On the floorboard of the passenger side, I 
located some syringes with a clear liquid residue in 
them. There was a backpack in the vehicle with 
identifying information placing it in Kaitlin's care. 
It was her backpack. 
black case. 
Q Okay. 
In that backpack there was a 
A Inside the case there were multiple 
syringes with a baggie of suspected crystal meth, and 
there was some pills, I believe. Some lorazepam. 
Q Okay. How did you identify the pills? 
A Initially I called the number in to 
dispatch with the identifying marks on it. 
me that information, and then I verified. 
They gave 
Q 
A 
Okay. How did you verify it? 
We use Pill Finder or drugfinder.com. Put 
the information in there and it pulls up a picture. 
Q Okay. And you 
MR. WINWARD: Let me object. I think 
that's double hearsay. It's at least hearsay. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. WHEAT) And how did they pull up, 
then, what they were -- what type of pill did they 
pull up as? 
A Lorazepam. 
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Q Okay. 
MR. WINWARD: Objection as to foundation. 
Dispatch can tell them what they think it is, but 
without the dispatch officer here to lay the 
foundation on what they looked at, where it came 
from, it lacks foundation as to what that pill was. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. WHEAT) Now, these -- tell me about 
this suspected methamphetamine. What made you 
suspect that it was methamphetamine? 
A My training and experience. It resembled 
crystal methamphetamine. It was a light crystal 
substance consistent with methamphetamine. The 
syringes are typically used for that type of drug 
when it's not smoked or ingested otherwise. I didn't 
MIC test it on scene. I didn't have a MIC test to 
perform that test. 
Q 
A 
that's 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
But in my training and experience, 
that's what it was. 
Okay. And how was it packaged, again? 
It was in a little baggie similar to -- a 
small one-inch by one-inch Ziploc-style baggie. 
Q Okay. Is that consistent with how that is 
usually packaged? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Okay. And how do you know that? 
Multiple drug cases that I've worked and 
contacts that I've had, training that I've had, 
and. 
Q Okay. And tell us about your training 
you've had in drug identification. 
A 
classes. 
I've taken several interdiction and drug 
I've been to training in Salt Lake at POST 
specifically for drug identification. Our department 
offers multiple per-year classes on identifying 
drugs, and it's the best I can say that, to my 
experience, that's what the drug is. 
Q And how about in the field? Have you seen 
the drugs multiple times? 
A Very often, yes, sir. 
Q Very often? Okay. And have you seen those 
drugs that you've seen test positive multiple times? 
A Yes. 
Q And is this consistent with the types of 
drugs that you've seen test positive in the past? 
Yes, sir. A 
Q Now -- and, again, tell us how the syringes 
fit into that. 
A Typically they will cook the crystal meth 
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down to a liquid form, draw it into a syringe, and 
then inject it. 
Q Okay. And did you interview the defendant 
after this? 
bag? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I did. 
Did you? Okay. Did you ask her about the 
I did. 
What was said? 
She identified the bag as hers. She told 
me exactly where it was in the truck. The 
identifying information that was in the backpack had 
her name on multiple cards that would be used for 
gaming in Mesquite. She identified those cards as 
hers, and they were in the backpack in the opposite 
pocket of the black case. 
Q Okay. And just to tell -- just to follow 
up, where did this take place, again? 
A The interview was at Washington County 
Correctional Center. 
Q Where was the truck? Sorry. 
A It was in front of the residence. 
Q Where was the residence? 
A I believe it's --
Q Just here in Washington County? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yeah. 
Okay. 
In St. George, yes. 
And do you recognize Kaitlin Homer in the 
courtroom today? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Where's she at? 
Right here next to Mr. Winward. 
Okay. Thanks. 
Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winward? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINWARD: 
Q Officer Iverson, in your report, you state 
that Kaitlin was driving the vehicle. 
Kaitlin driving the vehicle? 
A I did not. 
Did you see 
Q Okay. Why did you put that in your report? 
A 
there. 
vehicle. 
Q 
that 
She had all of her personal belongings in 
Her father told me that she was using the 
Okay. So when you say Kaitlin was driving, 
you weren't stating that she was actually 
physically moving the vehicle; rather --
A No. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
using the vehicle? 
Right. 
Okay. Where was the vehicle located when 
you conducted your search? 
A It was out in front of the residence. 
There's actually a driveway between the front of her 
residence and the adjacent residence, and she was 
parked on the east side of that driveway. 
Q Okay. So she was parked not in front of 
her residence but somewhere else? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Is it possible she was further down 
than just one driveway? 
A No. She -- it was -- it was -- it was 
right there next to that driveway. 
Q Okay. 
Stop shaking your head. 
MS. HOMER: Okay. 
MR. WINWARD: Thanks. 
Q Did you MIC test the suspected 
methamphetamine? 
A I did not. 
Q Okay. There's other items as well that are 
white crystalline substances, correct? 
A Sure. 
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Q Other items that are white crystalline 
substance that can be stored in a plastic baggie, 
correct? 
A Sure. 
Q Okay. Thanks. You stayed to collect 
witness statements for Officer Bahlmann's 
investigation into a trespassing call; is that 
correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Did you collect those witness statements? 
I did. 
Q 
A 
Did you provide those to Officer Bahlmann? 
Yes. 
Q Okay. How many witness statements did you 
collect? 
A I want to say just one. I know that there 
was another individual there, but I don't recall. 
Q Okay. Was the truck locked when you went 
into it or tried to go into it? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It was. She had locked it. 
Okay. Who had the keys to the truck? 
Her father had a key to the truck. 
Her father gave you a key to the truck? 
He had a key to the truck, yes. 
Do you know who owned the truck? 
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A It was registered to her father, Harley 
Homer. 
Q Okay. Had he sold the truck to his 
daughter, to Kaitlin? 
A I'm not aware of that. 
Q Okay. Did you find a bill of sale or 
anything in the truck? 
A No. 
Q During your in your report you say that 
you only searched the more obvious high probability 
items and areas. Why did you do that? 
A Just in the matter of time, you know. 
There's general areas that you would search. 
know, it's just ... 
Q What are those general areas? 
You 
A Floorboards, glove boxes, backpacks, things 
that would contain anything that. 
Q When you're -- when Mr. Homer gave you 
permission to search the vehicle, did he say, "You 
can search bags inside the vehicle"? 
A Yes. 
MR. WINWARD: Yeah? 
MS. HOMER: There's a bill of sale in the 
glove box, actually. 
Q (BY MR. WINWARD) Did you search the glove 
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box? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I did. 
Did you find a bill of sale in there? 
I wasn't looking for a bill of sale. No. 
Okay. When you searched -- when you asked 
Ms. Homer about the black bag inside the truck, were 
there more than one bag inside the truck? 
A Yes. There was --
Q How many? 
A quite a few. I don't know exactly how 
many. 
truck. 
There was -- there was a lot of items in the 
Q Okay. So it's possible when she said the 
black backpack inside the truck was hers, she was 
talking about a different bag? 
A I suppose. 
Q Okay. Did you leave any syringes in the 
vehicle? 
A I don't -- I don't know. I don't think so. 
I could have, some that were maybe new that hadn't 
been used. I'm not a hundred percent. It's not 
illegal to own a syringe, so ... 
Q Did you take the syringes that were filled 
with fluid? 
A Yes. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
Q 
Have you had those tested? 
No. 
Okay. 
Just a second. 
(Time lapse.) 
(BY MR. WINWARD) Did my client tell you 
that the truck was hers, that she had bought it? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I don't recall. 
Did you interview her at the jail? 
I did. 
Okay. Do you remember asking her whether 
the truck was hers? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Okay. It's not uncommon for people to be 
nervous when they encounter law enforcement officers, 
correct? 
A 
Q 
client 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Sure. 
Okay. Did you conduct a drug test on my 
No. We don't --
-- to see if she was under the influence? 
No. We don't do that. 
No field sobriety or anything like that? 
No. 
My client has a question. Do you only 
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arrest female individuals? 
MR. WHEAT: Objection, your Honor. 
Irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. WINWARD) Do you only arrest people 
that are using drugs? 
A No. 
Q Okay. I'm just curious. You've arrested 
males before, correct? 
A Many, yes. 
MR. WINWARD: Okay. Thank you. No other 
questions. 
THE COURT: Any follow-up, Mr. Wheat? 
MR. WHEAT: No, your Honor. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Officer. You can 
take a seat. 
Any additional evidence? 
MR. WHEAT: 
THE COURT: 
No, your Honor. 
Any argument? 
MR. WINWARD: I'm going to call Mr. Homer. 
Sorry. If that's okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Horner, if you would 
come forward, raise your right arm, and take the 
oath, please. 
II 
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HARVEY GORDON HOMER 
called as a witness and sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Homer, if you'll take a 
seat, please, in front of that microphone. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINWARD: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Could you state your name for the record? 
Harvey Gordon Homer. 
Where do you reside? 
438 East 300 South, St. George. 
You've heard the testimony this morning. 
Do you recall the events --
A I do. 
Q -- that occurred? Okay. Did you fill out 
a witness statement? 
I did. A 
Q Did anybody else in your household fill out 
a witness statement? 
A 
Q 
A 
driveway. 
I have no idea. 
Okay. Where was the truck parked? 
It was parked just outside of the -- my 
There's -- we have pretty much one 
continuous driveway 
Q Okay. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 1 9 
(@ i A between both houses. 
2 Q Is that your truck? 
3 A Yeah. 
i.:J)J 4 Q Did you sell it to your daughter? 
C:: A No. .., 
6 Q Did you give her a bill of sale? 
(,JI 7 A At one time I did, but there was an 
8 agreement that certain conditions would be met, and 
9 those conditions were not met. 
{(d) 10 THE COURT: Ms. Horner - - yeah, it's not 
11 helping. Can you just stop? 
12 MS. HOMER: Sorry, sorry, sorry. 
~ 13 THE COURT: You're really having a hard 
14 time with this. 
15 MS. HOMER: Sorry. 
~ 16 THE COURT: Okay? You'll be given an 
17 opportunity to testify, if you'd like to. 
18 MS. HOMER: Okay. 
~ 19 THE COURT: Until then, don't nod your head 
20 again. 
21 MS. HOMER: Okay. Sorry. 
~ 22 THE COURT: Or you'll be taken into 
23 custody. 
24 MS. HOMER: I apologize (inaudible) . 
"" 
25 Q (BY MR. WINWARD) So she -- what were those 
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conditions? 
A Well, we had a no-contact order in place, 
and, quite frankly, yes, I had agreed to give her the 
vehicle if she would stay in accordance with that 
agreement. 
agreement. 
She wouldn't stay in accordance with that 
Multiple times she would come over, being 
very -- being very disruptive and demanding things, 
and so, in my opinion, she didn't hold up to her end 
of the agreement. 
Q 
vehicle? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
point? 
A 
On August 28 of this year, who owned the 
It's still registered to me. 
Okay. 
And I -- yeah. It --
Had you given her the vehicle at that 
We had -- I had signed a paper, but the 
registration, insurance, everything, was still in my 
name. 
Q Did you consider the vehicle yours or hers 
on August 28th? 
A I considered it mine, because she had 
failed to live up to her end of the agreement. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
No. 
Were the items in the truck yours? 
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Q Were the items in the truck your -- what's 
your girlfriend's name? I'm sorry. 
A I don't have a girlfriend. 
Q Who is the person that's living in your 
home with you? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Anita Vaughn. 
Were the items in the truck (inaudible)? 
No. I have no idea. 
Okay. Did you give Officer Iverson 
permission to search the backpacks in the vehicle? 
A I gave him permission to search the truck. 
Q Okay. 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Wheat? 
MR. WHEAT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
THE WITNESS: You bet. 
THE COURT: Any further evidence? 
Mr. Winward? 
MR. WINWARD: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal testimony, 
Mr. Wheat? 
MR. WHEAT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any argument? 
MR. WINWARD: I don't believe -- wel 1, I 
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think your Honor should dismiss Count 1. The State 
hasn't provided any evidence that that crystal 
substance was methamphetamine. There was not even a 
MIC test done. If your Honor does bind over on Count 
1, it should be a Class A misdemeanor. I don't 
believe there 1 s been any evidence that my client has 
a prior qualifying conviction. 
THE COURT: It should be a Class A 
misdemeanor because of the change in the law? 
MR. WHEAT: And we -- we agree with that, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WHEAT: It should be a Class A 
misdemeanor. I will note, your Honor, that there is 
irrefuted evidence that this officer, based on his 
training and experience, recognized this to be 
crystal meth. It was accompanied by drug 
paraphernalia. It was also accompanied by behavior 
that he believed and recognized, based on his 
training and experience, to be that which is 
consistent with someone under the influence of 
controlled substances, and --
THE COURT: Why wasn't there a MIC test 
performed? 
MR. WHEAT: I'd leave that to the -- if --
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you know, I'd direct that to the officer. 
MR. WINWARD: I think he testified that he 
didn't have one on him. 
THE COURT: Why hasn't it been submitted to 
the lab? 
MR. WHEAT: To the lab at this point? 
Well, just because we usually do that when we know 
whether we're going to trial or not. It will be 
submitted probably tomorrow, is what we'll do. At 
this point, though, your Honor, with no evidence to 
the contrary, what we're looking for is a substantial 
basis to believe that this is methamphetamine, and I 
believe that that's absolutely met under the 
circumstances. White crystalline powder, drug 
paraphernalia, needles consistent with use, packaging 
consistent with methamphetamine, and, again, an 
officer who has had years of training and experience 
that recognized that to be consistent with 
methamphetamine. 
The standard here is for probable cause 
and, again, a substantial basis, and it's -- I'd say 
that's certainly met by the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winward, anything else? 
MR. WINWARD: Submit it, sir. 
THE COURT: Count 1 is dismissed. 
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Ms. Horner is bound over on Counts 2 and 3. Would you 
like to schedule arraignment or enter pleas today? 
MR. WINWARD: Just enter not guilty pleas 
today. 
THE COURT: Not guilty pleas are entered to 
counts 2 and 3. 
bench trial. 
The matter will be scheduled for a 
MR. WINWARD: Thank you. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Say that again. 
(Inaudible conversation.) 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Kaitlin 
Horner, Case 151501574. 
Mr. Wheat? 
Your witnesses in that case, 
MR. WHEAT: That will be Officer Zack 
Bahlmann, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer, if you' 11 
come forward and raise your right arm and take the 
oath, please. 
ZACK BAHLMANN 
called as a witness and sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
II 
II 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Wheat. 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WHEAT: 
Q Thanks, Officer Bahlmann. Could you please 
tell us your name, who you work for? 
A Zack Bahlmann. I work for the St. George 
Police Department. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Kaitlin 
A 
Q 
please? 
A 
Can you spell that last name for us? 
B-A-H-L-M-A-N-N. 
Okay. And did you come in contact with 
Homer on August 28th of 2015? 
Yes, I did. 
Tell us about that contact, would you, 
What was the nature of it? 
I was just following on her protective 
order violation. We had been called and advised that 
Kaitlin was out of the residence, in violation of the 
protective order. Dispatch had located a protective 
order that listed her as a respondent and the address 
as a protected address. 
I responded to the area to -- to make 
contact with her and complete an investigation. 
I pulled onto the street and noticed a red Dodge 
I --
pickup truck parked one house down the street from 
the residence. There had been information that she 
had arrived in a red Dodge pickup truck. I stopped 
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my patrol car. I saw her exit the driver's side of 
the red pickup truck. She approached me and I made 
contact with her there on the street in front of the 
residence. 
Q Okay. And do you recognize Kaitlin Homer 
in the courtroom today? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Where is she at? 
A At the defendants' table. 
Q Okay. Did you check whether there was a 
valid protective order? 
A I did later on in the investigation. I was 
initially the only officer on scene and I -- I had 
remaining contact with Ms. Homer, but after backup 
arrived ... (end of recording). 
* * * * 
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Addendu111 C 
Statutes 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties, UT ST§ 58-37-8 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties 
Currentness 
( 1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties and reporting: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionalJy: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, off er, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct that results in any violation of any provision of Title 
58, Chapters 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act, that is a 
felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, 37c, 
Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act, on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, 
supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony, punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than 15 years, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, or a substance listed 
in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection ( I )(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 
was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance 
of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may additiona11y sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
( d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( 1 )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence 
may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(e) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
the name, case number, date of conviction, and if known, the date of birth of each person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties and reporting: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or 
other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or 
distributing contro11ed substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is I 00 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II. or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
on a first or second conviction, and on a third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsection ( l) 
(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection {2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i) or (ii), including a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a third conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a fourth or subsequent 
conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied 
by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shal1 be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to 
controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, 
and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, 
and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of 
Section 76-5-207: 
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(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any measurable amount 
of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as 
defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a 
controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a 
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death as a result of the 
person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same 
episode of driving. 
(i) The Administrative Oflice of the Courts shall report to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
the name, case number, date of conviction, and if known, the date of birth of each person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is 
fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, 
to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription 
for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure 
the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving 
any control]ed substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception. subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
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(iii} to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a contro1led substance, or to utter the same, or to 
alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die. plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce 
the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the 
foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b}(i) A first or second conviction under Subsection (3 )(a)(i), (ii), or (iii} is a class A misdemeanor. 
(ii} A third or subsequent conviction under Subsection (3}(a)(i}, (ii), or (iii) is a third degree felony. 
(c) A violation of Subsection (3)(a)(iv) is a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any 
act that is unlawful under Subsection (l )(a), Section 58-37a-5, or Section 58-37b-4 is upon conviction subject to the 
penalties and classifications under this Subsection ( 4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools during the hours 
of 6 a.m. through 10 p.m.; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools 
or institutions during the hours of 6 a.m. through l O p.m.; 
(iii) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility during the prcschool's or facility's hours of operation; 
(iv) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center when the public or amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center is open to the public; 
(v) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-50 l; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a library when the library is open to the public; 
(vii) within any area that is within I 00 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections ( 4)(a)(i), 
(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi}; 
(viii) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs; or 
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(ix) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a substance in 
violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311. 3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term 
of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would 
have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended. and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first degree felony but 
for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d){i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a){ix): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a tem1 of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(ix). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to 
be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4){a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6)(a) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (I) and (2), a plea of guilty or no contest to a violation 
or attempted violation of this section or a plea which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, 
is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(b) A prior conviction used for a penalty enhancement under Subsection (2) shall be a conviction that is: 
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(i) from a separate criminal episode than the current charge; and 
(ii) from a conviction that is separate from any other conviction used to enhance the current charge. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and sentence for 
a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8){a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative 
penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal under 
federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof that _shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(1 O) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the veterinarian's professional 
practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing 
the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled 
substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's employment. 
( l 2)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2( 1) 
(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the 
practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), 
it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) 
as soon as practicable, but not later than IO days prior to trial. 
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(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the prosecutor 
is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
( d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the evidence. 
If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(l 3)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a controlled substance listed in 
Section 58-37-4.2 if the person: 
(i) was engaged in medical research; and 
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6. 
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection {l3)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a controlled substance listed 
in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a controlled substance listed in Section 
58-37-4.2 if: 
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid license to possess controlled 
substances under Section 58-37-6; and 
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher. 
( 15) The application of any increase in penalty under this section to a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(i) may not result in 
any greater penalty than a second degree felony. This Subsection (15) takes precedence over any conflicting provision 
of this section. 
(I 6)(a) It is an affirmative defense to an allegation of the commission of an offense listed in Subsection (16)(6) that the 
person: 
(i) reasonably believes that the person or another person is experiencing an overdose event due to the ingestion, 
injection, inhalation, or other introduction into the human body of a controlled substance or other substance; 
(ii) reports in good faith the overdose event to a medical provider, an emergency medical service provider as defined 
in Section 26-Sa-102, a law enforcement officer, a 911 emergency call system, or an emergency dispatch system, or 
the person is the subject of a report made under this Subsection (16); 
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(iii) provides in the report under Subsection (l 6)(a)(ii) a functional description of the actual location of the overdose 
event that facilitates responding to the person experiencing the overdose event; 
(iv) remains at the location of the person experiencing the overdose event until a responding law enforcement officer 
or emergency medical service provider arrives, or remains at the medical care facility where the person experiencing 
an overdose event is located until a responding law enforcement officer arrives; 
(v) cooperates with the responding medical provider, emergency medical service provider, and law enforcement 
officer, including providing information regarding the person experiencing the overdose event and any substances 
the person may have injected, inhaled, or othe·rwise introduced into the person's body; and 
(vi) is alleged to have committed the offense in the same course of events from which the reported overdose arose. 
(b) The offenses referred to in Subsection (16)(a) are: 
(i) the possession or use of less than 16 ounces of marijuana; 
(ii) the possession or use of a scheduled or listed controlled substance other than marijuana; and 
(iii) any violation of Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act. 
(c) As used in this Subsection (16) and in Section 76-3-203. l l, "good faith" does not include seeking medical assistance 
under this section during the course of a law enforcement agency's execution of a search warrant, execution of an 
arrest warrant, or other lawful search. 
(17) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
( 18) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less restrictive than any provision 
of this chapter. 
(l 9)(a) If a minor who is under 18 years of age is found by a court to have violated this section and the violation is the 
minor's first violation of this section, the court may: 
(i) order the minor to complete a screening as defined in Section 41-6a-501; 
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(ii) order the minor to complete an assessment as defined in Section 4 l-6a-50 I if the screening indicates an assessment 
to be appropriate; and 
(iii) order the minor to complete an educational series as defined in Section 41-6a-501 or substance abuse treatment 
as indicated by an assessment. 
(b) If a minor who is under 18 years of age is found by a court to have violated this section and the violation is the 
minor's second or subsequent violation of this section, the court shall: 
(i) order the minor to complete a screening as defined in Section 41-6a-501; 
(ii) order the minor to complete an assessment as defined in Section 4 l-6a-50 I if the screening indicates an assessment 
to be appropriate; and 
(iii) order the minor to complete an educational series as defined in Section 41-6a-501 or substance abuse treatment 
as indicated by an assessment. 
Credits 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § l; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 146, § l; Laws 
1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § I; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, 
c. 56, § 1; Laws I 989, c. 178, § L Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § I; Laws 1990, c. I 61, § l; Laws 1990, c. 163, 
§§ 2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, § l; Laws 1991, c. l 98, § 4: Laws 1991, c. 268, §7; Laws 1995, c. 284, § l, eff. May I. 1995; Laws 
1996, c. 1, § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 1996: Laws 1997, c. 64, § 6, cff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 139, § I, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
1999, c. 12, § I. eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 10, § l, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 
2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 36, § 1, eff. March 15, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 30, * 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 
2006, c. 8, § 4, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c. 30, § I. eff. May I, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 374, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 
2008, c. 295, § I, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 214, § 3, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 64, § 2, eff. March 22, 2010: 
Laws 2011, c. 12, § 8, eff. Feb. 25, 2011: Laws 2014, c. 19. § l. eff. March 20. 2014; Laws 2014, c. 51, § I, eff. May 13, 
2014; Laws 2015, c. 165, § 5, eff. May 12, 2015; Laws 2015, c. 412, § 165, eff. Oct. l, 2015; Laws 2016, c. 99, § 2, cff. May 
10, 2016; Laws 2016, c. 348, §44, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8, UT ST§ 58-37-8 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Almos) 
( 1) As used in this chapter: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2 
§ 58-37-2. Definitions 
Currentness 
{a) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, 
or any other means, to the body of a patient or research subject by: 
(i) a practitioner or, in the practitioner's presence, by the practitioner's authorized agent; or 
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
practitioner but does not indude a motor carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Consumption" means ingesting or having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, 
but this Subsection ( I )(c) does not include the metabolite of a controlled substance. 
(d) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business 
trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or groups of individuals associated in fact although not a 
legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities created or maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct 
which constitutes the commission of episodes of activity made unlawful by Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, 
Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or Chapter 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act, which episodes 
are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results. participants, victims, methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing 
unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
(e) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, substance, or immediate precursor under 
Section 58-37-3. 
(f)(i) "Controlled substance·· means a drug or substance: 
(A) included in Schedules I. II. III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4; 
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(B) included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513; 1 
(C) that is a controlled substance analog: or 
(D) listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(ii) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are defined in Title 328, Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act; 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation. treatment, or prevention of 
disease in human or other animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or 
phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfu1ly purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription; or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other similar substances including concentrates or extracts, 
which: 
(I) arc not otherwise regulated by law; and 
(II) may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chapter. or in rules adopted 
pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means: 
(A) a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled 
substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or in Schedules 
I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513; 
(B) a substance which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system 
substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of 
controlled substances listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or 
substances listed in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513; or 
(C) A substance which, with respect to a particular individual. is represented or intended to have a stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant. 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of controlled substances listed in Schedules I 
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and II of Section 58-37-4. substances listed in Section 58-37---l.2. or substances listed in Schedules I and II of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act. Title IL P.L. 9 l-513. 
(ii) '"Controlled substance analog .. docs not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in Schedules I through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new drug application: 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in effect for invcstigational use by a particular person under 
Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 355, to the extent the conduct with respect to the 
substance is permitted by the exemption: 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before an exemption takes effect with 
respect to the substance; 
(E) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation. treatment, or prevention of disease in man 
or other animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoepbedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or phcnylpropanolamine 
if the drug is lawfully purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter medication without 
prescription: or 
(F) dietary supplements, vitamins. minerals, herbs, or other similar substances including concentrates or extracts. 
which arc not otherwise regulated by law. which may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or 
substances listed in this chapter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 3. Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(h)(i) "Conviction .. means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no 
contest. for any offense proscribed by: 
(A) Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
(B) Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act; 
(C) Chapter 37b. Imitation Controlled Substances Act: 
(D) Chapter 37c. Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act; or 
(E) Chapter 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Acl; or 
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(ii) for any offense under the laws of the United States and any other state which, if committed in this state, would 
be an offense under: 
(A) Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
(B) Chapter J7a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act: 
(C) Chapter J7b. Imitation Controlled Substances Act: 
(D) Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act; or 
(E) Chapter 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act. 
(i) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any controlled substance or container or labeling of any controlled substance that: 
(A) without authorization bears the trademark. trade name. or other identifying mark. imprint, number, device, 
or any likeness of them. of a manufacturer, distributor. or dispenser other than the person or persons who in 
fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance 
distributed by any other manufacturer, distributor. or dispenser: and 
(B) a reasonable person would believe to be a controlled substance distributed by an authorized manufacturer, 
distributor. or dispenser based on the appearance of the substance as described under Subsection (I )(i)(i)(A) or 
the appearance of the container of that controlled substance; or 
(ii) any substance other than under Subsection ( I )(i)(i) that: 
(A) is falsely represented to be any legally or illegally manufactured controlJed substance: an<l 
(B) a reasonabk person would believe to be a legal or illegal controlled substance. 
(j) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive. or attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a listed 
chemical, whether or not an agency relationship exists. 
(k) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(I) "Depressant or stimulant substance'' means: 
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(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid: 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of the United 
States after investigation has found and by regulation designated habit-forming because of its stimulant effect 
on the central nervous system; 
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the 
Attorney General of the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, 
a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its hallucinogenic 
effect. 
(m) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful 
order or prescription of a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away. or disposing of that 
substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery. 
(n) "Dispenser'' means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled substance. 
(o) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(p) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances. 
( q) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(r)(i) "Drug" means: 
(A) a substance recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia 
of the United States, or Official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them, intended for use in the 
diagnosis. cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in humans or animals; 
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(B) a substance that is required by any applicable federal or state law or rule to be dispensed by prescription only 
or is restricted to administration by practitioners only; 
(C) a substance other than food intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of humans or other 
animals; and 
(D) substances intended for use as a component of any substance specified in Subsections ( I )(r)(i)(A), (8), and (C). 
(ii) --orug" does not include dietary supplements. 
(s) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and habitually uses any controlled substance to 
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled substances 
as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to the individual's dependency. 
(t) "Food" means: 
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and 
normally ingested by human beings; and 
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other condition 
including but not limited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, hypersensitivity 
to food, underweight, and overweight; uses for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and also uses for supplementing and for fortifying 
the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, mineral. or other dietary property for use of a food. Any particular 
use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of the nutritional purposes. 
(u) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and 
by regulation designated as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of 
a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled 
substance. 
(v) "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe. 
(w) "Indian religion" means any religion: 
(i) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian culture or community; and 
(ii) which is practiced by Indians. 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
§ 58-37-2. Definitions, UT ST § 58-37-2 
(x) ''Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or community oflndians, including 
any Alaska Native village, which is legally recognized as eligible for and is consistent with the special programs, 
services, and entitlements provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians. 
(y) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled 
substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of 
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis. 
(z) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or labels any container of any controlled 
substance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
(aa) "Marijuana., means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of the genus, whether growing or not; the 
seeds ofit; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, 
or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber 
produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the 
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained 
in the plant cannabis sativa or any other species of the genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and 
pharmacologically active are also included. 
(bb) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United States or any foreign country. 
(cc) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances 
of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical 
synthesis: 
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(iii) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of the substance, which is 
chemically identical with any of the substances referred to in Subsection (1 )(cc)(i), (ii), or (iii}, except narcotic drug 
does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of coca lc?ves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(dd) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which 
are legally transferable to another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(ee) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar 
to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. 
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(ff) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species pa paver somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(gg) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust. other institution or entity or one or more 
individuals. 
(hh) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds. of the opium poppy, after mowing. 
(ii) ''Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, 
of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For 
a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that the person be shown to have 
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the 
activity was occurring, or the contro1led substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person 
had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Uj) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist. naturopathic physician, veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, 
pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct 
research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of 
professional practice or research in this stale. 
(kk) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription: 
(i) orally or in writing; or 
(ii) by telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other electronic means of communication as defined by 
division rule. 
(II) "Prescription" means an order issued: 
(i) by a licensed practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's professional practice or by collaborative pharmacy 
practice agreement; and 
(ii) for a controlled substance or other prescription drug or device for use by a patient or an animal. 
(mm) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(nn) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of debt or of property. 
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(oo) "State·· means the state of Utah. 
(pp) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for the person's own use, for 
the use of a member of the person's household, or for administration to an animal owned by the person or a member 
of the person's household. 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined. the definition and terms of Title 76, Utah Criminal Code. shall apply. 
Credits 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 3; Laws 1979, c. 12, § l; Laws 1981, c. 75, § I; Laws 1982, c. 12, § I; Laws 
1987, c. 190, § I; Laws 1989, c. 50. § l; Laws 1989, c. 186, § l; Laws 1989, c. 225, § 60; Laws 1991, c. 198, § l; Laws 1992, 
c. 121. § 1; Laws 1994, c. 132, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 53, cff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 294, § l, eff. April 29, 1996; 
Laws 1997, c. 64, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2003, c. 131, § 40, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 241, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004: 
Laws 2005. c. 283, § 2, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 8, § 2, eff. May I, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 872, eff. May 5, 2008: 
Laws 2009, c. 42, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 64, § 1, eff. March 22, 2010; Laws 2010, c. 101, § 4, eff. May 11, 
2010; Laws 2010, c. 276, § 368, eff. July I, 2011; Laws 2011, c. 12, § 3, eff. July I, 2011; Laws 2012, c. 297, § 1, eff. May 
8, 2012: Laws 2015, c. 258, § 67, eff. May 12, 2015. 
Footnotes 
21 U.S.C.A. § 812. 
U.C.A. I 953 § 58-37-2, UT ST§ 58-37-2 
Current through 20 I 6 Third Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annas) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37a-5 
§ 58-37a-5. Unlavlful acts 
Currentness 
(1 )(a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation 
of this chapter. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection( 1 )(a) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2)(a) It is unlawful for any person to deliver. possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any 
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process. prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 1 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection(2)(a) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or older who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person younger than 18 years of age and 
who is three years or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree fe]ony. 
(4)(a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any 
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(5)(a) A person may not be charged with distribution of hypodermic syringes as drug paraphernalia if at the time of sale 
or distribution the syringes are in a sealed sterile package and are for a legitimate medical purpose, including: 
(i) injection of prescription medications as prescribed by a practitioner; or 
(ii) the prevention of disease transmission. 
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(b) A person may not be charged with possession of hypodermic syringes as drug paraphernalia if the syringe is unused 
and is in a sealed sterile package. 
(6) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and sentence for 
a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 76, § 5; Laws 2008, c. 295, § 3, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2011, c. 101, § 3, eff. May 10, 2011. 
Footnotes 
Laws 1981, c. 76, that enacted this chapter. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37a-5, UT ST§ 58-37a-5 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37a-3 
§ 58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined 
Currentness 
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material used, or intended for use, to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest. manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into 
the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and includes, but is not limited to: 
( 1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any species of plant which 
is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived; 
(2) kits used, or intended for use. in manufacturing, compounding, converting. producing, processing, or preparing a 
controlled substance; 
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled 
substance; 
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use. to identify or to analyze the strength. effectiveness, or purity of a 
controlled substance; 
(5) scales and ~alances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a controlled substance; 
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, rnannitol, mannited, dextrose and lactose, used, or intended 
for use to cut a controlled substance; 
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other impurities from marihuana; 
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or in tended for use to compound a controlled substance; 
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes. and other containers used, or intended for use to package small quantities of a 
controlled substance; 
(l 0) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a controlled substance; 
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( 11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance 
into the human body, except as provided in Section 58-37a-5; and 
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human 
body, including but not limited to: 
(a) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens. permanent screens, hashish 
heads, or punctured metal bowls; 
(b) water pipes; 
(c) carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too 
small or too short to be held in the hand; 
(f) miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials: 
(g) chamber pipes; 
(h) carburetor pipes; 
(i} electric pipes; 
(j} air-driven pipes: 
(k) chillums; 
(I) bongs; and 
(m) ice pipes or chillers. 
Credits 
Laws I 98 I, c. 76, § 3; Laws 2008, c. 295, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 201 I, c. IO I.§ 1, cff. May I 0, 2011. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37a-3. UT ST§ 58-37a-3 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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